Following is the result of research on prior Bitcoin-related thefts. I have provided dates and times as I know them. The list is designed to be as accurate and informative as possible, and most of it is well-referenced. For disputed thefts, I have applied best judgement and included the ones that were most publicly accepted.
Because of the volatile nature of Bitcoin's exchange price, I have denominated heist estimates in BTC. Although not heists per se, major permanent bitcoin-denominated losses are also included in this list. If I missed any major thefts, heists, or losses, or if you have any other information to contribute to one of these events, please leave a reply in this thread.
Additionally, I would be grateful if contributors write commentary for each theft. Ideally, the theft descriptions should be as detailed as possible. Much of the present commentary is inadequate.
This entire document is licenced under the public domain. If that is not permissible in your jurisdiction, it can then be licenced under any permissible licence of your choosing.
The author of this list believes all information contained thereof to be factual; however, the author takes no responsibility for any losses associated with factual inaccuracies in the list.
Although I make every attempt to ensure information in the list is well-cited and factual, there is always the possibility of error (whether on my part or on my source's part). If you find a factual naccuracy, please report it. You will be credited appropriately for such reports.
Donations are appreciated and are accepted at 1MLSW1nmYkHqaHWNNkHSAHct6exd8fYYLX. Alternatively, consider a donation to a charitable cause. Many victims of these thefts accept donations, and they likely need the donations more than I.
Without properly-defined bounds, this list could not possibly be complete. Consequently, several clauses below limit the scope of the list.
Generally, a major heist, theft, hack, scam, or loss must cause damage greater than or equal to 1000 BTC, in BTC damage only, to qualify for inclusion in this list. Thefts related to Bitcoin but with most damage in another currency do not qualify, unless customers were damaged in BTC. Borderline thefts may qualify if reasonable estimates are over or equal to 1000 BTC. Thefts that do not strictly qualify but are of significant importance are listed in the thefts not included section.
Managing Bitcoin prices
It is well-known that Bitcoin prices are volatile. Before 2011, the value of a single BTC was extremely low. Consequently, this list ignores most events that occurred before 2011. If a theft, hack, scam, or loss caused damage greater than or equal to 5000 BTC before 2011 (i.e., in 2009 or 2010), it is not listed on the severity charts. If a theft, hack, scam, or loss caused damage less than 5000 BTC before 2011, it is not listed on this list at all.
This list also employs USD cutoff values. Thefts with USD damages below the given cutoff for the year will still be included, but will be excluded from or unranked in severity lists.
Cutoff values so far are below:
Severity list cutoff
* These thefts are not listed in the BTC-denominated severity chart.
Included borderline thefts
Finally, another clause is provided to allow important thefts not meeting the cutoff to remain i ncluded. Borderline thefts, which have less than 1000 BTC in total damages, may still be included if their total damage when measured in June 2013 BTC exceeds 500 BTC. This measurement is based on Mt. Gox price data prior to 2013-06-09, Bitstamp price data after 2013-06-10, and US CPI data published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
For ease of navigation, I have assigned each theft a name. Note that this name is neither official nor permanent and is used solely for ease of navigation. To search for the heading that details the actual theft, simply use your browser's Find function and search for the name. This will either bring you to the theft itself, or a link to the theft. If the latter, simply click the link to be directed to the theft.
Some links will appear in commentary and in lists. These can be clicked; their destination is set to the beginning of the linked incident's section.
List of events by severity
NB: This section is under construction.
In this section, each theft is listed alongside the value stolen when converted to a June 2013 BTC equivalent. This represents the true value stolen and is generally the best list in that regard. No incidents need be left out of this list, thanks to its method of ranking based on true severity.
List of events by BTC value stolen
In this section, each theft is listed along with its rank, severity, and time, ordered by the highest mBTC value stolen from most severe to least. To navigate to a theft, simply click on the link.
List of events in rough chronological order Stone Man Loss Type: Loss Time: August 09, 2010, 11:35:00 PM ± 600 s Victim: Stone Man @BitcoinTalk Status: Coins lost, effectively destroyed Amount: Exactly8999.00000000BTC Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 5.73BTC Transaction of interest: eb5b761c7380ed4c6adf688f9e5ab94953dcabeda47d9eeabd77261902fccccf Due to not keeping proper wallet backups, 8999 BTC sent as change were effectively destroyed when the private key controlling them was lost. Because this theft is from 2010, it is not included in severity lists.
Ubitex Scam Time: April 2011 to July 2011 Victim: Investors on GLBSE of Ubitex Status: Ubitex founder known, but nothing returned Amount: About1138.98BTC (amount “invested” into Ubitex) Equivalent USD: 11668.70 $ (wt. avg) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 155 BTC Ubitex was the first company to be listed on the now-defunct GLBSE “stock exchange”, which has been criticised for its illegal operations. The company was run by a minor, but this fact was not initially known.
Around 1000 BTC of the missing investments are said to have been “spent”, many of which were further scammed, or converted into USD without follow-up.
The Ubitex scam would not have been possible today. Bitcoin users at the time were enjoying their newly-acquired wealth thanks to significant appreciation. Most “investors” at the time were extremely naïve.
Stefan Thomas Loss Type: Loss Time: June 2011 Victim: Stefan Thomas Status: Coins destroyed (no thief) Amount: Estimate7000 BTC Equivalent USD: 128000 $ (wt. avg, rounded to nearest thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 1250 BTC Stefan Thomas, an early adopter (and eventually developer) of Bitcoin, uses this loss to teach other Bitcoiners the importance of backups—many of them. He had three copies of his wallet, and yet lost all of them.
Allinvain Theft Time: June 13, 2011, 05:52:00 PM ± 600 s [satoshi estimated block transmission time] Victim: Bitcointalk.org user “allinvain” Status: Thief uncaught Amount: Exactly25000.01000000BTC Equivalent USD: 502750.20 $ Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 4480 BTC Chief transaction of interest: 4885ddf124a0f97b5a3775a12de0274d342d12842ebe59520359f976721ac8c3 A polarizing theft, its authenticity has undergone much dispute. Some believe that it was set up as a ploy for donations. However, these critics often lack evidence to back up their claims. Indeed, the victim was an early adopter who mined many coins at a low cost, so there is little reason for him to sabotage Bitcoin's image.
Although the hack attracted great attention in its day, said fame has mostly subsided. Even today, however, the hack still affects Bitcoiners. A common debate among Bitcoin users is that of “tainting” coins, and this hack is often used as an example for why “tainting” coins is futile. In just a few years, coins stolen in this hack are now present in nearly every user's wallet. This rapid redistribution is often cited as a reason that a tainted coin system would certainly fail.
June 2011 Mt. Gox Incident Time: June 19, 2011, 06:00:00 PM ± 1 h (theft), days ensuing (hacks & withdrawals) Victim: Mt. Gox (some claim also customers) Status: Thief uncaught Amount: Stolen by thief: 2000 BTC Additional withdrawn from Mt. Gox: 643.27BTC (lower bound) Total: Lower bound2643.27BTC Equivalent USD: 46970.91 $ (trades on Mt. Gox not reliable at the time) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 473 BTC Transactions: none released officially Mt. Gox, then the leading BTC/USD exchange service, suffered a severe breach as a consequence of an ownership change. The sale conditions involved a share of revenue to be remitted to the seller. To audit this revenue, the seller was permitted an account with administrator access.
The seller's administrator account was hacked by an unknown process. The priveleges were then abused to generate humungous quantities of BTC. None of the BTC, however, was backed by Mt. Gox. The attackers sold the BTCgenerated, driving Mt. Gox BTC prices down to cents. They then purchased the cheap BTC with their own accounts and withdrew the money. Some additional money was stolen by non-attacking traders capitalizing on the dropping price and withdrawing in time, including toasty, a member of BitcoinTalk.
Mt. Gox resolved the hack by reverting trades to a previous version. Many customers claim they have lost money from this reversion, but Mt. Gox claims it has reimbursed all customers fully for this theft. After the incident, Mt. Gox shut down for several days.
The event's scale was widely disputed; some report a theft of almost 500000 BTC due to related account hacking. However, these reports are sparse and disreputable. Closer inspection puts the losses at closer to 2500 BTC.
Aside from the direct damages of the theft, the hack involved a database leak. Some weaker passwords were used to conduct the relatively more severe Mass MyBitcoin Thefts.
Mass MyBitcoin Thefts NB: Not to be confused with the far more severe MyBitcoin Theft. Time: 2011-06-20 through 2011-06-21 Victim: MyBitcoin users with weak account passwords Amount: Exactly4019.42939378BTC Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 712 BTC Transactions: all to 1MAazCWMydsQB5ynYXqSGQDjNQMN3HFmEu Users with weak passwords on MyBitcoin who used the same password on Mt. Gox were in for a surprise after the June 2011 Mt. Gox Incident allowed weakly-salted hashes of all Mt. Gox user passwords to be leaked. These passwords were then hacked on MyBitcoin and a significant amount of money lost.
MyBitcoin estimates indicate 1% of MyBitcoin users were affected. Users that were not affected would be later stolen from anyways, due to the subsequent MyBitcoin Theft.
MyBitcoin Theft Time: Unknown time in July 2011 (claimed it was a process) Victim: MyBitcoin & customers Status: Thief unknown, planned shutdown suspected (disputed theft) Suspects: “Tom Williams”, likely pseudonym (founder of MyBitcoin) Amount: Exactly78739.58205388BTC Equivalent USD: 1110544 $ (wt. avg, definitely >$1M, rounded to nearest $) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 10600 BTC Transaction information: none Little information was released about the MyBitcoin theft, however, many argue that Tom Williams ran it as a scam (and was not a theft per se). In terms of both dollars and bitcoins, this was by far the largest theft, however, it is possible it was simply a scam. Although MyBitcoin offered to release its code as a gift to the community, it failed to follow through on that promise. In the months ensuing,some evidence has been uncovered supporting mortgage broker Bruce Wagner; however, any evidence is inconclusive. The theft resulted in the closure of MyBitcoin, which was once a successful Bitcoin company in Bitcoin's early days.
Bitomat.pl Loss Type: Loss Time: 2011-07-26 Victim: Bitomat.pl Status: Coins destroyed (no thief) Amount: Estimate17000 BTC (likely estimate/lower bound, no tx due to technical reason) Equivalent USD: 236000 $ (rounded to nearest thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 2290 BTC Bitomat.pl, during a server restart, had its remote Amazon service that housed the wallet wiped. No backups were kept. Mt. Gox later bailed bitomat.pl out, and neither customers nor original owners suffered any loss from the incident.
Mooncoin Theft Time: 2011-09-11 Victim: Mr. Moon, Mooncoin, & Customers Status: Unknown (Federal intervention suspected) Amount: Estimate4000 BTC (conservative estimate based on SC values) Equivalent USD: 24000 $ (rounded to nearest thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 219 BTC Transactions: numerous Moonco.in's hack has been compared to the MyBitcoin of SolidCoin, back when it remained a powerful cryptocurrency. Over 800000 SC have been removed from circulation, only to have been put back through SolidCoin 2.0. The effects on Bitcoin were also substantial, and the effect on Namecoin was not negligible. In total, this may have been the worst cross-currency hack in cryptocurrency history.
Bitcoin7 Hack Time: 2011-10-05 (UTC) Victim: Bitcoin7 & Customers Status: Hacker unknown (officially from Eastern Europe or Russia), scam suspected, some returned Amount: Estimate11000 BTC*
Based on size of order books at that time, ~15000.
A quarter supposedly not stolen (3 of 4 wallets compromised).
Rounded to 11000 BTC
* Bitcoin7 may have disappeared with more (u.b. 15000 BTC). Equivalent USD: 50000 $ (rounded to nearest ten thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 346 BTC Bitcoin7 later shut down because of this hack. The magnitude served as a reminder to the Bitcoin community to stop trusting new exchanges without identification.
October 2011 Mt. Gox Loss Type: Loss Time: 2011-10-28T21:11 (UTC) [blockchain time, off by up to three hours] Victim: Mt. Gox Status: Coins destroyed (no thief) Amount: Exactly2609.36304319 BTC Equivalent USD: 8115.12 $ (wt. avg price) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 82.0BTC Transactions:
Mt. Gox fully reimbursed customers after this incident.
Bitscalper Scam Time: January 2012 to March/April 2012 Suspects:
Victim: Users of Bitscalper Status: MiningBuddy (bitcointalk.org user) attempted to reorganize bitscalper, but failed. No coins
have been returned at all.
Amount: Estimate1000 BTC (official estimate)
Equivalent USD: 5000 $ (wt. avg, rounded to nearest thousand)
Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 47.9BTC Bitscalper was founded as an “arbitrage engine”, and users were invited to deposit money. It was promising extremely high and unrealistic returns. As a result, it was suspected of being a scam from the beginning, fears that were compounded due to a shady and anonymous management. After Bitscalper shut down without returning user funds, BitcoinTalk user MiningBuddy attempted to reform Bitscalper using the remnants of the engine. However, no success was found and the coins could not be returned.
Bitcoin Savings and Trust Time: 2011–2012 Victim: Creditors of First Pirate Savings and Trust, later Bitcoin Savings and Trust Status: Trendon Shavers (Perpetrator) caught by SEC Amount: Lower bounds150649 BTC, 193319 BTC, 200000 BTC; Estimate 263024 BTC; Upper bound>700467 BTC
Equivalent USD: 1834303 $
Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 26800 BTC More information on Trendon Shavers default.
Andrew Nollan Scam Time: February 2012 Victim: Investors of Shades Minoco, creditors of bitcointalk.org user “shakaru”, investors of
Status: Andrew Nollan (a.k.a. shakaru) (thief) known but disappeared, repaid some
(not included in amount)
Amount: Lower bound2211.07786728 BTC, possibly more 
Equivalent USD: 10978 $ (wt. avg price, rounded to nearest $)
Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 106 BTC
Linode Hacks Time: Late 2012-03-01, Early 2012-03-02 Victim: Bitcoinica, Bitcoin.cz mining pool (Marek Palatinus), Bitcoin Faucet, possible others Status: Thief unknown, not caught. Linode employee suspected. Amount:
In early March 2012, the New Jersey-based web and cloud hosting company Linode was
suspected of robbing many popular Bitcoin services. A vulnerability in the customer support
system was used to obtain administrator access to the servers. Once the Linode servers were
compromised, eight accounts dealing with bitcoins were targeted. The hardest hit was the
bitcoin trading platform, Bitcoinica. This resulted in the unauthorized transfer of BTC from the
“hot wallets”, a term used to describe operational withdrawal wallets, of the services affected.
A severe bitcoin-denominated theft, the Linode theft also affected Tradehill, but no coins were
stolen from them; instead, Tradehill had a short downtime because of the incident. In the
aftermath of this theft, all the services migrated to other platforms. To this day, Bitcoin users
fear Linode and usually refrain from using its services.
Betcoin Theft Time:
Theft Commences Transaction: #1, #2
Theft Continues Transaction: #3
Theft Culminates Transaction: #4
All times are blockchain time, and have possible error of up to 3 hours. Victims: Betco.in, creditors Status: Hacker not known. Some of creditors' deposits were repaid, around 2900 BTC outstanding. Amount: Exactly3171.50195016BTC Equivalent USD: 15509 $ (rounded to nearest $) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 148 BTC Transactions of interest:
Similar to the Mooncoin Theft a year ago, and just as devastating, a gambling website's
customers lost a large amount of money. This time, the owner took just as large a hit: all the
deposits, plus non-live storage, were stolen. 2900 BTC remains to be refunded to creditors today.
Tony Silk Road Scam Time: 2012-04-20 Victim: Buyers on Silk Road Status: Scammer known to be Silk Road user “Tony76” Amount: Estimate30000 BTC Equivalent USD: 150000 $ (wt. avg price, rounded to nearest thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 1400 BTC Users of Silk Road, an underground drug market using Bitcoin as the default currency, bought
significant quantities of illicit drugs from trusted vendor “Tony76”. Although Silk Road has an
escrow system, trusted vendors are allowed to bypass the system and request that the buyers
pay first. On April 20, which is a popular day for drug sales in American culture, Tony76 offered
drugs at a significant discount. However, none of the products made it to the customers,
revealing the sale as an elaborate sham.
May 2012 Bitcoinica Hack Time: May 12, 2012, 11:19:00 AM [blockchain time, off by up to three hours] Victim: Bitcoinica, LLC Status:
Hacker unknown, minimal coins were returned.
Venture capital group Wendon Group threatened legal action against Bitcoinica Consultancy.
Receivership in New Zealand ongoing.
Bitcoinica: Exactly 18547.66867623 BTC
Creditors of Bitcoinica: Pending liquidation
BitMarket.Eu: About 19980 BTC
Total impact: At least38527 BTC Equivalent USD: 91306.46 $ (last Mt. Gox price) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 1830 BTC Chief transaction of interest: 7a22917744aa9ed740faf3068a2f895424ed816ed1a04012b47df7a493f056e8 Zhou Tong, former founder of Bitcoinica, discovered an entry into Bitcoinica's Rackspace server
through an excessively privileged compromised email address. This caused the theft of the entire
“hot wallet”, funds stored on-site, as well as the loss of the main database. No backups were
kept. Bitcoinica shut down because of this incident. The claims process is still ongoing; however,
Bitcoinica is now entering receivership.
On December 21, 2012, it was discovered that BitMarket.eu lost a large portion of customer
funds which were stored on Bitcoinica. These customers were reportedly unaware that their
funds were stored on Bitcoinica. Return of a portion of these funds is still possible, pending the
Suspect: IP 188.8.131.52 Status: Pending Amount: Exactly1852.61553553 BTC Equivalent USD: 12134.61 $ Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 140 BTC Medium of theft: Mt. Gox Transactions of interest: On Mt. Gox. Withdrawal transaction was
4c61d3639f010e30ad305b294cd128f381f58fc161d0badda1f39807dc2f12f7. A hacker infiltrated the Mt. Gox account used by Bitcoin Syndicate, sold off the USD owned, and
withdrew all balances.
July 2012 Bitcoinica Theft Time: 2012-07-13 (UTC) Victims:
Creditors of Bitcoinica (former users of Bitcoinica)
Selling bitcoins after event
Status: All funds returned Amount: Exactly40000.00000000 BTC (Mt. Gox Daily Limit) Equivalent USD: 305200 $ (wt. avg, rounded to nearest $) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 3030 BTC Medium of theft: On MtGox. On July 13, 2012, a thief compromised the Bitcoinica Mt. Gox account. The thief made off with
around 30% of Bitcoinica's bitcoin assets, which are likely to cost claimants of Bitcoinica debt.
Additionally, 40000 USD was also reported to be stolen. The thief is still unknown at this point,
but the theft has supposedly been entirely returned. This theft further complicated the
* Person has denied committing theft after initially pretending to do it. Evidence supports
the faked theft admission as mere trolling. † Account used at the time of the theft, no longer active.
BTC-E (accusation of inside job): Little evidence has been provided; as BTC-E reimbursed
its customers, the only thing it could gain from faking the theft was PR—and faking poor
security is usually not considered useful PR.
Status: Pending Amount: Estimate4500 BTC (Official estimate) Equivalent USD: 42000 $ (rounded to nearest thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 340 BTC Medium of theft: On BTC-E. On July 31, 2012, the BTC-E Liberty Reserve API secret key was broken. This key was shorter
than it needed to be at only 16 characters long. The attacker initiated many Liberty Reserve
deposits and injected large amounts of USD into the system, which were quickly sold for BTC.
Not all BTC was withdrawn; official estimates state that the scope was limited to 4500 BTC.
of the hack. The handling of this hack was widely applauded after BTC-E revealed they would
cover the losses and revert to a backup made just before the hack.
Bitfloor Theft Time:
Theft Commences Transaction: #1
Theft Continues Transaction: #2, #3
Theft Culminates Transaction: #4, #5
All times are blockchain time, and have possible error of up to 3 hours. Victims: Bitfloor, creditors Status: Hacker not known, but IP is 184.108.40.206. Some coins repayed to creditors. Amount: Upper Bound24086.17219307BTC Equivalent USD: 248088 $ (rounded to nearest) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 2570 BTC Transactions of interest:
Although the keys to the hot wallet of Bitfloor was secured, an unencrypted backup was
mistakenly stored on some of the servers. After a hacker gained entry, most of not only the hot
wallet but also the cold wallet was stolen. To this date, none of the coins have been returned by
the hacker to Bitfloor. Although Bitfloor briefly shut down after the incident, it has since restarted
and has committed to repaying its creditors. Unfortunately, Bitfloor's banks shut down the
exchange's operation before all coins could be recouped.
Cdecker Theft Time: September 28, 2012, 07:21:14 PM Victim: Cdecker Status: Thief IP may be 220.127.116.11 Amount: Exactly9222.21195900 BTC Equivalent USD: 113894 $ (rounded to nearest) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 984 BTC Transactions of interest:
A trojan horse stole thousands of BTC between September and November of 2012. BitcoinTalk
user “mralbi” was a major victim, losing almost 2600 BTC. The same hacker also stole 200 BTC
from Mt. Gox accounts, supposedly with the same trojan which doubled as a keylogger.
Bit LC Theft Time: Discovered February 13, 2013 Victim: Bit LC Inc. and miners Status: Suspected theft by “Erick”, could be misunderstanding. Amount: Estimate2000 BTC Equivalent USD: 51000 $ (rounded to nearest thousand) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 481 BTC Transactions of interest: This alleged theft was unique in that coins held in the hot wallet were safe, but coins held in a
cold wallet compromised. The thief is not expected to have access to the coins regardless, so
there was little financial gain from this theft. Erick, allegedly the only one with physical access to
Bit LC Inc.'s cold wallet, has failed to communicate and withdraw coins. Bit LC Inc. therefore was
required to declare bankruptcy. There is no proof that Erick intentionally stole the coins; indeed,
some evidence asserts that he or she may simply have disappeared in some manner.
BTCGuild Incident Time: March 10, 2013 Victim: BTCGuild mining pool Status: 16 thieves, one has returned 47 BTC Amount: About1254 BTC Equivalent USD: 58737 $ (rounded to nearest) Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 675 BTC When BTCGuild was upgrading the Bitcoind client to 0.8, the mining pool used its original upgrade
plan. However, 0.8 is unique in that it reindexes the blockchain. This prompted a temporary state
in which the pool was paying out for difficulty-1 shares, as that was the extent of the blockchain
parsed. Sixteen separate thieves subsequently emptied the hot wallet. 47 BTC have been
returned to the pool. The pool would on the following day lose even more money thanks to a bug
causing its recent upgrade to 0.8 to
differ from nodes running 0.7 or lower.
2013 Fork Time: 2013-03-11 Victims: OKPay, many mining pools including slush, BTCGuild, etc. Status: OKPay double-spend attack resolved. Amount: Exactly960.09645667BTC Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 517 BTC A major blockchain fork occurred due to a bug in Bitcoin-Qt clients which had not upgraded to the
new 0.8 version. Unfortuantely, those clients formed the majority of Bitcoin users at the time.
The resulting fork split mining pools; those that had upgraded lost block revenue. Some mining
pools took the hit, whereas others passed the cost on to miners.
The fork also made possible isolated double-spending attack. Only one such attack was conducted,
costing OKPay significantly. Luckily, the thief has since returned the money.
Bitcoin Rain Date: 2011-10-03 to 2013-03-28 Victims: Investors in Bitcoin Rain, account holders on Mercado Bitcoin. Perpetrator: Leandro César Amount: Estimate4000 BTC Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 2150 BTC A suspected long-running con likened to the infamous Bitcoin Savings and Trust, Bitcoin Rain
finally defaulted on March 28, 2013. Leandro César claimed there was a security breach on his
exchange website Mercado Bitcoin. As Bitcoin Rain's funds were stored there, investors in
Bitcoin Rain as well as account holders on Mercado Bitcoin lost money. Some money was
reportedly paid back, but the vast majority is still outstanding.
ZigGap Date: February to April 2013 Victim: Investors and creditors of ZigGap Amount: About1708.65967460BTC Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 919 BTC User aethero, who was originally a reputable Bitcoiner, founded ZigGap after two previously
succesful ventures, including BitPantry. Purporting to offer easy ways to purchase BTC, ZigGap
saw little business. The founder seems to have also suffered mental illness in the latter stages
Ozcoin Theft Time: 2013-04-19 Victim: Ozcoin mining pool Status: Thief, a user of Strongcoin, known but not disclosed. Strongcoin seized funds and
returned 568.94BTC to the mining pool operator.
Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 983 BTC A hacker managed to infilterate Ozcoin's payout script, such that all money was paid out to the
hacker's address. Luckily, a day later Strongcoin seized most of the stolen funds and promptly
returned them to Ozcoin.
Just Dice Incident Time: 2013-07-15 Victim: Just-Dice investors, Dooglus Suspect: Just-Dice.com user “celeste”, who claims he was hacked. Status: Bets rolled back. Amount: About1300 BTC Equivalent USD: About121000 $ Equivalent in June 2013 BTC: 1000 BTC A player on Just-Dice.com with an especially large balance asked to withdraw 1300 BTC. Because
the hot wallet did not contain that much money, Just-Dice.com operator “dooglus” manually
processed the transaction from the cold wallet. However, “dooglus” forgot to remove the balance
in Just-Dice.com's database. The Just-Dice.com user then proceeded to bet the fake balance on
the gambling website and subsequently lost it all. Because of the manner Just-Dice.com is
structured, the website lost money even though the malicious user did not earn any money from
To recoup losses, the operator rolled back the gambling losses and corrected the wrong balance.
This resulted in losses for all “investors” of Just-Dice.com; however, the operator explains that
nobody actually lost money because the bet should never have happened. In conclusion, it seems
that odd decisions on the malicious user's part and probability ensured no actual loss from the
incident, even though 1300 BTC was stolen. The amount was simply lost back to Just-Dice.com
thanks to luck in the website's favour.
Silk Road Seizure Dates:
2013-10-02: First seizure (Silk Road user funds)
2013-10-25: Second seizure (Ross Ulbricht's personal coins)
Inputs.io Hack Date: 2013-10-26 (disputed) Victim: Inputs.io, passed on to creditors. Perpetrator: Accusations of inside job. Transaction of interest:
Amount: Estimate 4100 BTC Inputs.io, a web wallet service run by BitcoinTalk user TradeFortress, was supposedly “hacked”
in October 2013 and was unable to repay user balances in full. There are many accusations of
the hack being an inside job. TradeFortress had a contentious reputation and had supposedly
scammed two separate people before this incident. When the theft was announced in
November 2013, TradeFortress began offering partial refunds; however, 4100 BTC was not paid
back as that was the shortfall from the supposed “hack”.
Thefts without known chronology Kronos Hack Time: ? Suspects:
Victim: Kronos.io Status: Legal action possibly pending Amount: Estimate4000 BTC (official estimate) Amount in June 2013 BTC: 400 BTC A serial scammer, Alberto Armandi reportedly hacked into a website he himself coded.
The vulnerability was in the withdrawal script that Alberto coded, reportedly intentionally as a
backdoor. Information about Kronos is highly uncertain, due to a lack of communication. Jonathon Ryan Owens was not responsive to demands for information.
Thefts not included Some thefts in Bitcoin's history, although severe and damaging to Bitcoin users, did not involve
the theft of over one thousand bitcoins. These thefts are listed below.
World Bitcoin Exchange, due to fraudulent activity, stole over 5000 BTC worth at the time
in AUD. The total amount stolen was 25779.49 AUD. More information: